Moreover, the author argues that Halleck failed to capitalize on a key victory against General Beauregard in Corinth, Mississippi. Instead, the author writes that Halleck wasted a great deal of time and effort in making territorial gains in the more rural, lesser-populated areas of Western Tennessee. With a surplus of resources and soldiers, the Union should have been bolder in capturing key cities in Tennessee like Chattanooga.
Halleck, in particular, is criticized for being too focused on occupying and holding contested areas, as opposed to advancing troops as quickly as possible through Southern areas all the way to the sea. Halleck, emerge somewhat as "whipping boys" for the author's thesis about the Union's early failures. The Union's first two chief generals, George B. In this way, the author places added weight on the ways that the respective commanders-in-chief, Abraham Lincoln and Jefferson Davis, influenced broader military actions. But before diving into specific examples, Stoker lays out a grand unifying theory of war strategy, visualizing it as an inverted pyramid with "policy" at the top, followed by "grand strategy," "strategy," "operations," and "tactics." Other major discussions of military strategy limit the "three areas of warfare" to just strategy, operation, and tactics. Stoker's general thesis is that while the Union eventually developed a brilliant strategy-or "grand design"-to overpower the Confederate Army, it took far too long and cost the nation far too many lives.
Civil War (2010), a non-fiction Civil War book, American author and military historian Donald Stoker examines the differing strategies employed by the Union Army and the Confederacy and how these strategies affected the outcome of the war. In The Grand Design: Strategy and the U.S.
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